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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Andrew Hubbard appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After being convicted in California of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a 
child under fourteen, Hubbard became subject to sex offender registration 
requirements. (#39449 PSI, 1 pp.5-7); see I.C. § 18-8307. In April 2011, Hubbard 
absconded from his California parole and traveled to Idaho. (#39449 PSI, p.9.) 
In June 2011, California authorities informed Idaho authorities about Hubbard's 
active felony warrant and possible presence in Idaho. (#39449 PSI, p.2.) Idaho 
police officers located and arrested Hubbard. (Id.) A record check revealed that 
Hubbard had not complied with the sex offender registration requirement in 
Idaho. (Id.) 
The state charged Hubbard with failure to register as a sex offender. (See 
(#39449 PSI, p.1.) Hubbard pied guilty. (#39449 Tr., p.11, L.3-p.17, L.13.) The 
district court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with five years fixed, to run 
consecutive to any other sentence Hubbard was currently serving. (#39449 Tr., 
p.29, L.15 - p.34, L.16.) 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the guilty plea form, transcripts 
of the change of plea and sentencing hearings, and the presentence 
investigation report associated with Hubbard's prior appeal, No. 39449. (8/7/14 
Order.) The district court previously took judicial notice of these documents in 
the course of the post-conviction proceeding. (R., pp.116-117.) 
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On direct appeal, Hubbard asserted that the district court violated his 
double jeopardy rights and abused its sentencing discretion. See State v. 
Hubbard, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 374, Docket No. 39449 (Idaho App., 
February 21, 2013). Specifically, Hubbard argued that the district court 
essentially punished him a second time for his prior crime by considering 
California's lenient prior sentence in its own sentencing analysis, and by focusing 
too heavily on the underlying sex offense in sentencing Hubbard in the new 
failure to register case. See id. The Idaho Court of Appeals did not consider the 
double jeopardy claim because Hubbard failed to raise it below. kl The Court 
also held that Hubbard failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion because: (1) the comments made by the court pertaining to the 
underlying sex offense conviction were primarily made in response to sentencing 
arguments made by Hubbard; and (2) the district court properly considered 
Hubbard's entire criminal history in imposing its sentence. kl 
Hubbard then filed a post-conviction petition, in which he raised the same 
double jeopardy claim he attempted to raise on direct appeal. (R., pp.4-18.) The 
district court summarily dismissed the petition, primarily relying on the same two 
grounds utilized by the Court of Appeals in rejecting Hubbard's abuse of 
sentencing discretion claim. (R., pp.116-132.) Hubbard timely appealed. (R., 
pp.133-136.) 
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ISSUES 
Hubbard states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. 
Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief based on its 
inappropriate explanation of its statements at the sentencing 
hearing. 
2. Whether the district court erred by not ruling on Mr. 
Hubbard's motion for the district court judge to recuse himself 
from this case. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Hubbard failed to show that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction double jeopardy claim? 
2. Has Hubbard failed to show that the district court erred in declining to 
consider his recusal request, where the request was contained within 
Hubbard's post-conviction petition, rather than in an I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) 
motion for disqualification for cause? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hubbard Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Double Jeopardy Claim 
A. Introduction 
Hubbard contends that the district court violated his double jeopardy rights 
by essentially sentencing him a second time for his underlying California sex 
offense conviction, and that the district court thus erred in summarily dismissing 
his post-conviction double jeopardy claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-15.) 
Specifically, Hubbard contends that the district court erred by making factual 
findings regarding the rationale for its sentence, and by basing those findings on 
its own memory. (Id.) Hubbard's argument fails because a review of the record 
reveals that the district court did not punish Hubbard a second time for his 
previous sex offense conviction, and because the court rejected Hubbard's 
double jeopardy argument on grounds readily apparent from the sentencing 
transcript. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
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C. The District Court Did Not Violate Hubbard's Double Jeopardy Rights 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 
P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
The district court may, on a party's motion or its own initiative, summarily 
dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Ridgley v. State, 148 
Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2010). The procedure for summary 
dismissal is equivalent to that for a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Thus, dismissal is 
appropriate on determination that no "genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file." kl 
The double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370, 
256 P.3d 776, 778 (2011). 
In this case, the district court granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Hubbard's post-conviction petition after concluding that Hubbard 
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failed to establish a violation of his double jeopardy rights. 2 (R., pp.116-132.) 
After citing portions of the sentencing transcript, the court concluded that 
Hubbard's sentence was based upon his extensive criminal history and repeated 
failure to comply with the terms of probation, and that the comments made by the 
court at the sentencing hearing regarding Hubbard's underlying California sex 
offense conviction were made in response to a sentencing argument set forth by 
Hubbard, and did not demonstrate that the court punished Hubbard a second 
time for that crime. (R., pp.116-123.) A review of the record supports the district 
court's determinations. 
At the sentencing hearing, it was Hubbard's counsel who brought up the 
issue of Hubbard's California conviction, and that conviction's relationship to the 
district court's sentencing decision on the new failure to register charge. 
Hubbard's counsel asserted that Hubbard would be extradited back to California, 
where he faced potential parole revocation and the likelihood of several years 
incarceration on the underlying sex offense. (#39449 Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, 
L.24.) It would be "unfair" to the Idaho taxpayers, Hubbard's counsel continued, 
for Hubbard to be imprisoned in Idaho in light of these pending criminal 
consequences in California. (Id.) Hubbard's counsel asked the district court to 
"let California handle this." (#39449 Tr., p.26, Ls.19-24.) Essentially, Hubbard's 
counsel was asking the court to impose a more lenient sentence due to his 
2 The district court did not consider, and the state did not assert, that Hubbard 
waived his double jeopardy claim by failing to raise it during the sentencing 
hearing. The district court considered and rejected the state's argument that the 
doctrine of res judicata barred the district court's consideration of the claim. (R., 
p.93; Tr., p.8, L.16 - p.9, L.3.) 
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pending criminal consequences in the California case. 
The district court rejected Hubbard's argument. In so doing, the court 
appropriately considered Hubbard's failure to register as a sex offender, his prior 
criminal history, and his ongoing danger to the community: 
And there are consequences. In our society one of the only 
ways we feel comfortable having people like yourself out in the 
community is if they register so that everybody is on notice that 
they need to keep their children and their young girls away from 
you. 
In this case I want to remind you that - you have a fairly 
significant criminal history. You have DUls, infliction of corporal 
injury on your spouse or co-habitant including multiple times, 
battery. And in this case you - in 2002 you were charged with four 
counts of L&L. Four. You pied to two. They gave you five years 
probation. This is the reason that I don't really listen to [Hubbard's 
counsel's] argument. 
I recognize what I'm going to do is going to cost the 
taxpayers here, but I suspect that the taxpayer would just as soon 
as pay the cost to make sure that you're locked up and not trust 
California to do what it's supposed to do. You have four L&L's, you 
pied to two, and they put you on five years probation. You were 
only on probation a short period of time when they had to revoke it. 
They then put you in prison. Then they put you back out. 
(#39449 Tr., p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.4.) 
Later, in response to Hubbard's comment to the presentence investigator 
that Hubbard was "shocked" that the state was recommending a ten year unified 
sentence (PSI, p.14), the district court reiterated, "[t]he failure to register [as a 
sex offender] is significant. As I told you, it's so that we make sure that people 
like you, other people are aware of." (#39449 Tr., p.32, Ls.7-19.) 
The district court did not punish Hubbard for his prior crime for which he 
had already been sentenced, it rejected Hubbard's counsel's argument that the 
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district court sbould impose a more lenient sentence because of potential (though 
not necessarily inevitable) future criminal consequences in California. The 
district court was appropriately concerned with Hubbard's criminal history and the 
protection of the community. It did not expressly or otherwise indicate an intent 
to punish Hubbard for his underlying lewd and lascivious conduct conviction. 
Hubbard has therefore failed to establish a double jeopardy violation. 
On appeal, Hubbard contends that the district court erred by making 
factual findings regarding the rationale for its sentence and by basing those 
findings on its own memory. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-15.) These contentions fail. 
The district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing in this case, and 
expressly recognized that no additional factual findings were necessary. (Tr., 
p.16, Ls.2-5.) Further, the district court did not need to rely on its memory to 
conclude either that Hubbard's sentence was based upon his extensive prior 
criminal record, or that its comments regarding Hubbard's California conviction 
were made in response to a sentencing argument made by Hubbard, because, 
as discussed above, both grounds were readily apparent from the sentencing 
transcript. (See #39449 Tr., p.30, L.5 - p.32, L.6 (the district court discussing 
Hubbard's prior criminal history); #39449 Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.27, L.6 (Hubbard 
stating that his "main argument" was that the underlying sex offense occurred in 
California, and that the court should therefore impose a more lenient sentence so 
that California could "handle this.")) 
These two primary grounds for the district court's rejection of Hubbard's 
double jeopardy claim were so apparent from the existing record that the same 
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two grounds were utilized by the Idaho Court of Appeals in rejecting Hubbard's 
challenge to his sentence on direct appeal. Hubbard, 2013 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 374. In fact, the district court quoted from the Court of Appeal's opinion in its 
dismissal order. (R., pp.119-120, 123-124.) 
Hubbard also makes much of the district court's references made during 
the sentencing hearing to the victim of Hubbard's underlying lewd conduct 
conviction. (Appellant's brief pp.9-12.) However, these references did not 
transform Hubbard's sentence for failure to register as a sex offender into an 
unconstitutional second punishment for the underlying lewd conduct conviction. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized in affirming Hubbard's sentence on direct 
appeal, the failure to register conviction is "necessarily intertwined" with the 
underlying lewd conduct conviction. Hubbard, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 
374 at 2 ("consideration of the underlying case by the district court was plainly 
necessary to determine the extent of the danger Hubbard posed to society by 
failing to register as a sex offender"). 19.:. 
Indeed, the purpose of the Idaho Sexual Offender Registration Notification 
and Community Right-To-Know Act is to protect communities from sexual 
offenders by providing public access to certain information about those offenders. 
I. C. § 18-8302. It was entirely appropriate for the district court to consider the 
victim of Hubbard's underlying sex offense, the scope and duration of the abuse 
perpetrated by Hubbard, and Hubbard's attitude towards his victim, in evaluating 
the danger Hubbard continues to pose to Idaho children in light of his failure to 
comply with registration requirements. 
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Hubbard has failed to show that the district court violated his double 
jeopardy rights. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Hubbard's post-conviction double jeopardy claim. 
11. 
Hubbard Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Declining To 
Consider His Recusal Request, Where The Request Was Contained Within 
Hubbard's Post-Conviction Petition, Rather Than In An I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) Motion 
For Disqualification For Cause 
A. Introduction 
Hubbard contends that the district court erred by declining to rule on the 
recusal request contained within his post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-17.) Hubbard's argument fails because his recusal request did not satisfy 
the requirements of a motion to disqualify a judge for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(2), and therefore, the district court was not required to address it. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err In Declining To Construe Hubbard's Post-
Conviction Petition As Containing A Motion To Disqualify The District Court 
Judge 
In a civil proceeding, a party may move to disqualify a judge from 
presiding in any action on the grounds of bias or prejudice. I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2). 
The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit "stating distinctly the grounds 
upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in support of the 
motion." I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(B). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(A) requires 
written motions to be accompanied with a notice of hearing. 
Whatever the source of the bias or prejudice alleged, it must be so 
extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. Back v. Bagley, 148 
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Idaho 784, 791-792, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153-1154 (2010). Unless there is a 
demonstration of pervasive bias derived from either an extrajudicial source or 
facts and events occurring at trial, there is no basis for judicial recusal. kl at 
792, 229 P.3d at 1154. Once a motion for disqualification has been filed, "the 
presiding judge shall be without authority to act further in such action except to 
grant or deny such motion for disqualification." I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5). 
In a section of his post-conviction petition3 entitled, "State specifically the 
relief you seek," Hubbard included the following request: "That district court judge 
Cheri C. Copsey recuse or exclude herself from further hearing or involvement in 
this matter at hand." (R., p.7.) Even assuming that Hubbard was seeking to 
disqualify the judge from the post-conviction proceeding, and not from the 
underlying criminal case, this request did not constitute a valid I.C.R.P. 40(d)(2) 
motion to disqualify the district court judge for cause for several reasons. First, 
Hubbard did not make the request in the form of a motion. Second, he did not 
cite I.C.R.P. 40(d)(2) in making the request. Third, he did not accompany the 
3 Hubbard's post-conviction petition and request for the district court judge to 
recuse herself were filed pro se. (See R., pp.4-18.) The district court 
subsequently granted Hubbard's motion for the appointment of counsel. (R., 
pp.19-22, 33-34.) Hubbard's appointed counsel did not move to disqualify the 
district court judge, or otherwise attempt to raise the issue. 
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request with an affidavit stating distinctly the grounds for disqualification.4 Finally, 
Hubbard did not accompany his request with a notice of hearing, as required by 
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A). 
Where an otherwise compliant motion to disqualify a judge for cause is not 
accompanied by an affidavit, it may be treated as a motion to disqualify without 
cause. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 112-113, 233 P.3d 38, 
43-44 (2009). However, even if Hubbard's motion could be so construed, his 
argument fails because there is no right to disqualify an assigned judge in a post-
conviction proceeding - without cause - where the assigned judge is the same 
one who presided over the underlying criminal case. I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(1)(ii); Smith 
v. State, 126 Idaho 106, 108-109, 878, P.2d 805, 807-808 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Because the presiding post-conviction judge in this case was the same judge that 
imposed Hubbard's sentence, Hubbard did not have a right to seek 
disqualification without cause. 
Hubbard did not file a proper I.C.R.P. 40(d)(2)(A)(4) motion to disqualify 
the district court judge for cause. He therefore has failed to show that the district 
court erred in declining to rule on any such request. 
4 Hubbard's petition containing the request for recusal was sworn and notarized. 
(R., pp.4-7.) However, even if this petition could have been liberally construed as 
a consolidated motion and affidavit to disqualify the district court judge for cause, 
Hubbard did not allege any specific grounds for disqualification other than a 
conclusory and unspecified allegation that the judge engaged in "clearly apparent 
and evidenced [sic] prejudicial comments and beliefs." (See R., pp.6-7.) Even 
that allegation was raised only in the context of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, in which Hubbard asserted that his trial counsel should have 
moved to disqualify the district court judge. (R., p.6.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
summarily dismissal of Hubbard's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 17th day of October, 2014. 
~-~N~' 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEARBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of October, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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